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Abstract
In the safety analysis of fast reactors, unprotected accidents, such as ULOF and
UTOP have to be considered, even when their frequency of occurrence lies far
beyond the design basis accident. In the European Fast Reactor (EFR), the safety
approach foresees further measures of risk minimization in the frame of the so-
called Third Shutdown Level. One of the measures is a control rod enhanced ex-
pansion device, called ATHENa, which has been developed by KfK in collab-
oration with SIEMENS as a passive device to separate the absorbers from the
drive Iines in cases of accidental coolant temperature rises and to force the ab-
sorbers further into the core in case of failure to drop.
The efficiency of the ATHENa devices to prevent sodium boiling and fuel melting
in unprotected accidents in EFR has been investigated by calculations with the
dynamics code DYANA2. In the case of ULOF accidents, sodium boiling can be
prevented, if at least one out of 24 absorber rods equipped with ATHENa devices
drops into the core after delatching from the drive lines. In the extremely remote
case that all rods remain jammed after delatching, they are pushed by the ATHE-
Na decices into the core with an enhanced expansion coefficient ("'10 times). Even
then, sodium boiling could be prevented by extending of the pump coast down
halving time from 10 to 12 s or by adjusting the delatching temperature to a value
not higher than about 40 oe above nominal coolant outlet. In UTOP accidents
caused by the uncontrolled withdrawal of a control rod, the main concern is in-
cipient fuel melting. The results of the calculations have shown that the power rise
can be terminated by delatching the absorbers, before fuel melting occurs, if the
ramp rate is mechanically Iimited to values of 1 ~/s or less. Again, even in the
worst case that all rods remain jammed, fuel melting could be prevented by ad-
justing the delatching temperature to a similar value as in the ULOF case.
Über den Einfluß von Kontrollstab-Dehnungsverstärkern auf
den Verlauf auslegungsüberschreitender Störfälle im EFR
Zusammenfassung:
Bei der Sicherheitsanalyse Schneller Reaktoren werden auch Durchsatz- (ULOF)
und Reaktivitätsstörtälle (UTOP) betrachtet, die wegen der extremen. Seltenheit
ihres Auftretens zum Bereich der auslegungsüberschreitenden Störtälle gehören.
Beim EFR wird die schon geringe Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeit dieser Störtälle
durch Einführung einer "dritten Abschaltebene" weiter reduziert. Eine Maßnahme
besteht darin, die Kontrollstab-Gestänge mit einem eigens dafür von KfK und
SIEMENS entwickelten Dehnungsverstärker ATHENa zu versehen, der aufgrund
des passiven, thermischen Dehnungseffekts bei einem Anstieg der
Kühlmitteltemperatur die Abschaltelemente vom Gestänge trennt.
Die Wirksamkeit dieser Vorrichtung bei der Verhinderung von Kühlmittelsieden
und Brennstoffschmelzen im Falle auslegungsüberschreitender Störtälle wurde
mit dem Dynamik-Programm DYANA2 untersucht. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, daß bei
einem Durchsatzstörtall Kühlmittelsieden verhindert wird, wenn mindestens einer
der vom Gestänge entkoppelten 24 Absorberstäbe abfällt. Selbst beim Nichtabfall
aller abgehängten Stäbe werden die Absorber infolge der ca. 10-fach verstärkten
Expansion der Dehnungsverstärker ATHENa in den Kern geschoben. Auch dann
kann Kühlmittelsieden verhindert werden, allerdings muß dafür die Pumpenaus-
laufzeit von 10 auf 12 s verlängert oder die Schalttemperatur nicht höher als 40
oe über den Nominalwert der Kühlmittelaustrittstemperatur eingestellt werden.
Bei Reaktivitätsstörfällen, bei denen die Reaktivitätsrampen auf Werte < 1 ~/s
beschränkt werden, genügt ebenfalls das Abfallen eines Abschaltstabs, um
Brennstoffschmelzen zu verhindern. Sollten alle Stäbe klemmen, so genügt wie-
derum zur Verhinderung von Brennstoffschmelzen eine ähnliche Anpassung der
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The principal objective of nuclear safety is to protect individuals, society
and the environment against radiological hazards. Traditionally, core dis-
ruptive accident sequences, although of extremely low probability, have
constituted the primary risk of nuclear reactors to public health and safety.
In order to regain public acceptance of nuclear power in the future, it is
therefore of fundamental importance to reduce this risk still further to a
minimum practicable level. This coincides with the requirement to minimize
the economic and financial risk for the utilities. Another issue is that nu-
c1ear power has to compete favourably with other energy sources on a
commercial basis. There are a number of requirements to reduce the cost
of nuclear power - reduction of system complexity, shorter licensing peri-
ods, increase of standardization, solution of the problem of spent fuel dis-
posal, etc. -, but they will not be treated in the present paper.
The safety of a reactor basically resides in its capability of providing reli-
able reactivity control (and shutdown) and heat removal, both during op-
eration and after shutdown, with the ultimate objective of being able to
contain any radioactive material inside the plant. This is achieved by the
defence-in-depth strategy which relies on .
1. prevention of faults,
2. detection of faults and
3. mitigation of accident consequences.
All reasonable practical steps must be taken at the first line of defence, the
prevention of accidents, but also at the final line of defence, mitigation of
radiological consequences.
The response of the Light Water Reactor (LWR) technology to this challenge
has been to adopt both an evolutionary and a revolutionary path [1,2,3].
Present LWRs offer a broadly developed and mature technology basis and
a potential for further improvement. The high quality in operation and
maintenance has been reached in compliance with the stringent safety re-
quirements, incorporating the feedback from plant operation experience
and the results from extensive R&D programmes as weil as the lessons
learned from incidents and accidents. In view of this vast wealth of expe-
rience, future technology is seen to be based as much as possible on ex-
isting experience. In this way, this approach can be seen as an evolution-
ary development. LWR plants are designed with enhanced engineered saf-
ety and even passive safety features are now considered where they ap-
pear to offer advantages. For this approach it is not necessary to build
demonstration plants and to enter into long-term development pro-
grammes.
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There are also programmes for reactor concepts which mostly depend on
innovative systems that differ from current technology: the revolutionary
path. They incorporate in advanced plant designs as much as possible of
passive safety features wh ich are conceived to be more reliable than en-
gineered systems, since depending on gravity, thermal hydraulics and
other physics laws and not requiring the intervention of operators or the
use of externally activated electrical or mechanical devices. This path is
also characterized by a tendency to develop smaller unit sizes which ap-
pear to offer some advantages in simplification and construction which
.compensate for the sacrifice of economy of scale.
A similar tendency as described for LWRs can be observed in the field of
Liquid Metal Cooled Reactor (LMR) technology. Some key safety features
are intrinsic to LMRs and are already present in currently operating reac-
tors, such as absence of depressurization faults, large heat sink of primary
coolant, easy establishment of natural circulation and large margin to
coolant boiling in normal operations. An additional freedom is the choice
of fuel: oxide, metal, carbide or nitride. On the other hand, there are two
areas where LMRs could be less intrinsically safe than LWRs: Use of so-
dium coolant has the potential for exothermic sodium-air and sodium-water
reactions and the use of Plutonium fuel in a fast spectrum yields a much
reduced fraction of delayed neutrons compared to LWRs. However, the
SEFOR experiments [4J have successfully demonstrated the efficacy of the
Doppler effect in mixed oxide-fuelled fast reactors: they provide excellent
stability in spite of the reduced fraction of delayed neutrons. The risk of
sodium reactions has led to the adoption of an intermediate sodium heat
transport system which poses an economic penalty, but offers also the
beneficial effect of increased thermal inertia in the case of a loss of steam
generators heat sink. In general, it can be stated that most of the safety
considerations are equally applicable to LMRs and LWRs [5].
11. EFR Safety Approach
EFR has Iike all other fast reactors some remarkable safety features as
mentioned above. Its considerable margin to coolant boiling in normal
operations are illustrated in Fig.1. The safety approach being taken in the
design of EFR is described in [6J. For the purpose of a better understanding
of the scope of the present paper, some key principles of this approach
are briefly outlined.
The design targets for EFR are set as folIows:
- The frequency of core melt is less than 10-6/year.
- Consistent with this core melt frequency, the loss of shutdown
function or loss of decay heat removal function is less than 10-7/yea r.
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Without going too much into details, which are described in [6J, some fea-
tures of the reactor shutdown system will be discussed here to show how,
in this special case, these targets can be achieved.
In addition to the physical barriers (fuel matrix, fuel pin c1adding and pri-
mary coolant system) engineered features are incorporated into the system
to provide defence in depth. For the reactor shutdown the function is as-
sured by two independent, redundant and diverse systems. Each system
is able to shut down the reactor and comprises a trip system and the as-
sociated absorber rod group. Each absorber rod group consists of a mix-
ture of two different rod types, the Contro! and Shutdown Rods (CSD) and
the Diverse Shutdown Rods (DSD):
- first group (RG1): 12 CSD + 5 DSD,
- second group (RG2): 12 CSD + 4 DSD.
The sensors of each trip system (core outlet temperature measurement and
neutron flux monitoring) are connected to a logic which commands the
gravity drop of one absorber group. A feedback-free link between the two
systems ensures that one trip system is sufficient to initiate the drop of
both absorber rod groups.
In the safety analyses of fast reactors, a Iimited number of initiating faults
have been identified wh ich, although never expected to occur are, never-
theless, mechanistically possible. They are representative of the most se-
vere accidents of their category. The more important ones are:
- single absorber rod withdrawal,
- primary pipe rupture,
- single subassembly fault.
The design of the reactor is largely based upon an analysis of these faults.
The event which resülts in the highest damage level is commonly labelied
the Design Basis Accident (DBA). If it appears that the consequences of a
particular family of events are beyond the design criteria, then design
measures have to be taken to reduce their frequency of occurrence.
Beyond the DBA, there lies the domain of Hypothetica! Accidents. In this
domain, successive failures of multiple barriers are assumed, which nor-
mally are provided and maintained. Serious consequences can develop
when a major off-normal condition is encountered combined with a postu-
lated failure of the plant protective system. These events are generally
classed as Unprotected Transients or Anticipated Transients Without Scram
(ATWS).
Although the occurrence of these circumstances in fast reactors is highly
improbable, Hypothetica! Accidents have been extensively considered in
safety analyses. Because LMR cores are not arranged in their most reac-
tive configuration, the consequences of core compaction has to be ex-
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plored. In this aecident path, the ultimate neutronie shutdown eould only
eome about by the development of fuel and/or eoolant vapour pressure,
whieh would physieally disassemble the eore. This has led to the eommonly
used term Hypothetieal Core Disruptive Accident (HCDA). There is another
conceivable path of Hypothetical Accidents, which may lead to permanent
shutdown by core melting into a suberitical array, not requiring disruptive
vapour pressures. To distinguish both paths, the first is usually referred to
as energetie HCDA.
In the whole range of unprotected accidents, three specifie initiators have
emerged to serve as standard events to assess the safety margins of the
plant:
1. the Unprotected Loss of Coolant Flow (ULOF) by loss of power to the
pumps,
2. the Unprotected Transient Overpower Accident (UTOP) which is caused
by inadvertent withdrawal of one or more control rods and
3. the Unprotected Loss of Heat Sink (ULOHS) which implies that the
system can no longer remove heat.
The EFR safety approach foresees, in addition to the preventive measures
already provided within the design basis, to have further measures of risk
minimization. For convenience, for those measures supporting the shut-
down function, the name Third Shutdown Level is used. With these meas-
ures, the preventive line of defenee is strengthened and will reaeh such a
degree of reliability, that severe accidents will be relegated far into the
residual risk domain. The Third Shutdown Level consists of active and
passive features, such as control rod stroke limitation or Control Rod En-
hanced Expansion Devices (CREED) whieh are intended to exclude core
damage even in events of shutdown systems failure. The additional line of
defence provided by the Third Shutdown Level is located within the grey
area of Fig.1 between the defenee line of automatie protection and the
limits of eoolant boiling and fuel melting.
There are a number of plant eharacteristies whieh have a major impact on
the behaviour of the reaetor to an ATWS event. They ean be inherent and
thus be an integral part of the design (reaetivity eoeffieients, natural cireu-
lation, extended pump eoast down) or engineered whieh are specifieally
introduced to improve the reaetor response to transient and aecident eon-
ditions. They are further distinguished into passive and aetive. A passive
feature is one that is automatically aetivated through a physieal lawof na-
ture (gravity, ehanges in temperature, pressure or neutron f1ux ete.) onee
the transient has eaused exeeeding a trigger threshold. The Control Rod
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Enhanced Expansion Device, called ATHENa [7J, is an example of this cate-
gory of passive devices. Its performance is described in Sect.lV.
The present note is mainly concerned with the analysis of ULOF and UTOP
events in EFR under the assumption that the control rod drive Iines are
provided with enhanced expansion devices of the type ATHENa.
111. Reactivity Feedbacks
As the temperature changes during a transient, feedbacks are activated
according to their associated time constants and their net effect is govern-
ing the dynamics of the system. The most important feedbacks which are
taken into account in the dynamics code DYANA2 [8] are discussed below.
Their coefficients are given in Sect.V.2.
Doppler Effect: The Doppler effect, which is affected by the fuel temper-
ature, is generally the fastest acting feedback mechanism. It removes re-
activity from the system as the fuel temperature rises and can thus help to
limit the extent of power increases. But in the case of power reductions,
when the fuel temperature drops, the reactivity effect is positive and tends
to Iil)1it the power decrease. The local effect is calculated at each fuel node
and weighted over the core region to give the total effect.
Fuel Axial Thermal Expansion: The fuel thermal expansion is a relatively
fast acting feedback mechanism. Its radial component is accommodated
within the pin and does not affect the reactivity significantly. Axial fuel ex-
pansion increases the core height as temperature rises and increases the
radial neutron leakage which has a negative effect on the reactivity. Again,
as in the case of the Doppler effect, the sign of the reactivity changes if the
fuel temperature decreases.
Sodium Density Effect: The coolant density decreasing with temperature
affects the r~activity mainly by two effects of opposite sign: (i) spectral
hardening and (ii) increased neutron leakage. The former effect is positive
and strong in the central core region whereas the latter effect is negative
and increases near the edge of the core. The global effect is positive in
the EFR. If the sodium temperature rises up to boiling, the sodium density
effect is rapidly increasing as the coolant is expelled from the channels
(sodium void effect). This condition presents an important safety problem
for fast reactors, a problem not present in thermal readors. The reduction
of the core height from 1.4 m to 1.0 m in the new EFR core design was
essentially intended to reduce the sodium void reactivity. In the DYANA2
code, the temperature effects of clad and structure (steel), affecting the di-
5
mensions cf the coolant channels, are included in the sodium density ef-
fect.
Core Radial Expansion: The radial expansion of the core is a result of
thermal expansion as weil as design of the core and restraint system. The
core restraint system is designed to limit the motion of the active core
zones of fuel assemblies and to displace them outward as the temperature
increases. In DYANA2, this effect is separately treated and called Bowing
Effect. Its efficacy is not easy to demonstrate, therefore this (negative) re-
activity effect is neglected in this study. Thermal expansion of the core in-
creases the axial neutron leakage causing a negative feedback. It depends
on the axial coolant temperature rise and on the increase of the core inlet
temperature which causes an expansion of the grid plate. The Inlet Tem-
perature Effect is generally only significant in ULOHSs.
Control Rod Drive Une (CRDL) Expansion: As the core outlet temperature
increases during the initial period of a transient, the CRDL, Usually sup-
ported from the reactor head, becomes hotter and expands down further
into the core. This provides an effective means of passively inserting neg-
ative reactivity. The reactivity depends on the control rod positions in the
core. Later in the transient the reactor vessel has time to heat up, which,
in turn, causes a relative movement between core and CRDL with the effed
of withdrawing the control rods by some of the previously inserted dis-
tance. This is the reason that the CRDL expansion effect does not shut
down the reactor permanently, but provides only a prolonged "grace" time.
It will be seen, how the ATHENa device changes this situation totally.
IV. The Control Rod Enhanced Expansion Device ATHENa
This device has been developed by KfK in cooperation with SIEMENS to
increase the thermal expansion effect of the EFR CRDL. The basic design
features are as folIows, more details can be found in [7]. ATHENa is a hy-
draulic expansion module consisting of a sodium-filled container with ex-
pansible metal bellows. With increasing temperature the expanding sodium
volume elongates the bellows and increases the length of the device. By
adjusting the cross section of the bellows, the expansion can be increased
by about a factor of 10 compared to the normal, thermal CRDL expansion.
The device is designed to attain a thermal expansion coefficient of about
1 mm/K. This is also the value which has been used in the dynamics cal-
culations.
Dynamics calculations [7J had shown that in a ULOF accident ATHENa is
very efficient in reducing the initial coolant outlet temperature rise and
preventing coolant boiling, but the ensuing decrease of coolant temper-
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ature causes a reduction of the length of the CRDL resulting in a with-
drawal of the control rods from the core. The coolant temperature starts to
rise again, thus initiating a new cycle. Under certain conditions, this feed-
back may lead to system instability.
A solution to this problem was to use the elongation of ATHENa to separate
the absorber mechanically from the CRDL, such that a successive reduction
of its length can no longer withdraw the absorber from the core. In order
to realize this idea, CRDL and absorber are connected through a ball re-
lease mechanism, which delatches if the elongation of the device reaches
a threshold value, which can be chosen by adjusting the quantity of sodium
in the container. Normally, after delatching the absorbers drop by gravity
and terminate the transient by a shutdown of the reactor. Even in the ex-
tremely unrealistic case that an absorber control rod is delatched, but
cannot drop due to increased friction in the absorber channel, the en-
hanced thermal expansion of the device is forcing the absorber rod further
into the core, thus providing sufficient negative reactivity to terminate the
transient.
In the EFR the ATHENa devices are mounted on the CRDLs in the lower
part of the Above Core Structure(ACS) [9]. The drive lines move in shroud
tubes and are immersed in f10wing hot sodium. The temperature response
of the device depends on the coolant temperature in the shroud tubes
which is influenced by the mixing of sodium entering into the ACS with the
sodium already present. The mixing time constant is f10w dependent and
its value has been determined by thermal hydraulic calculations. The fluid
dynamics code FLUTAN [10], a vectorized and improved version of the code
COMMIX, has been used to calculate the temperature response of a 3-di-
mensional model of ATHENa, housed in the EFR control rod shroud tubes
of the ACS, during different types of transients.
The results showed that the time-dependent expansion of the device can
be weil described by two subsequent first-order low-pass filters applied to
the temperature of the coolant entering the shroud tube. This model has
been implemented into the dynamics code DYANA2 (see Sect.V.1) which
is applied for the present analysis and the following values have been used
in the calculations:
- a first low-pass filter with a time constant 1"1 = 8/q s, representing the
mixing of the sodium in the shroud tubes with a relative flow rate of
q (q = 1.0 at nominal conditions, following the f10w reduction in the
core until q = 0.5 and remaining constant for the rest of the LOF),
- a second low-pass filter with a time constant 1"2 = 6 s, representing
the heat conduction from the sodium of the shroud tubes to the so-
dium in the ATHENa container.
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The delatching mechanism is activated as soon as the threshold length of
ATHENa is reached. This corresponds to a delatching temperature Tdel of
the container sodium.
In order to model the absorber rod movements relative to the core, the
following effects have to be included in the dynamic code:
- CRDL expansion including ATHENa,
- the thermal expansion of the core support plate and the vessel,
- the absorber rod movements.
In the case of a control rod withdrawal in a UTOP, only the net effect of
withdrawal and expansion is considered. If the absorber did not drop after
delatching, the CRDL either rises alone leaving the absorber rod behind in
its fixed position in the core or the absorber rod is forced further into the
core depending on the net effect of thermal expansion rate of ATHENa and
speed of CRDL withdrawal.
'I. Dynamics Calculations
The efficiency of ATHENa devices to prevent sodium boiling or fuel melting
in ATWS events has been investigated for the EFR with the dynamics code
DYANA2. In the following, a short description of some of the principal
features of the code are given, followed by an outline of the specific data
of EFR and conditions of the calculations. More details about DYANA2 can
be found in [8].
V,1. The Dynamics Code System DYANA2
The dynamics code system DYANA2 contains separate modules for net-
work fluid dynamics and component thermal hydraulics and has a great
flexibility to simulate different design features (pool or loop, branched or
unbranched secondary system, etc.) with a choice of model sophistication
(simplified or detailed core model, simplified 1-dimensional DYANA model
or 2-dimensional code ATTICA for the hot plenum, etc.).
The core is subdivided into a number of parallel channels consisting of a
fuel pin, surrounded by coolant and structure. Usually, a channel repres-
ents an average pin in a fuel subassembly or a group of subassemblies,
but it can also represent blanket assemblies or control rod channels or the
hot channel for safety analyses. A channel includes the whole length of the
subassembly, from coolant inlet to coolant outlet. Different axial zones re-
present subassembly sections (fuel and axial blankets, gas plenum, upper
and lower reflectors, etc.).
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The fuel section of the pin is treated in more detail than the other sections.
Each axial level contains radial nodes for fuel, coolant and structure (clad-
ding and duct walls). Several radial nodes can be used in the fuel region
to describe porosity distribution and restructured zones with fuel properties
depending on temperature. The dependence of gap conductance on fuel
and c1adding temperature is described by using a relationship that was
calibrated with a fuel performance code. The model allows fuel melting
between a sol idus and liquidus point. Coolant boiling, however, is not
modelled.
Reactivity includes contributions from the control and safety systems and
different types of feedback reactivity as described in Sect.lll such as local
contributions from Doppler, fuel expansion, sodium and steel density as
weil as global contributions from radial core expansion, bowing and control
rod drive line thermal expansion effects.
Time-dependent fission power is calculated by point kinetics including de-
layed neutrons. Decay heat power can be chosen for each core channel
and total power (fission plus decay heat) is assumed to be Iiberated in the
fuel.
DYANA2 provides thermodynamic models for the following components;
core, hot and cold plena, pipe, in-vessel pipe, intermediate heat exchanger,
steam generator, immersed cooler and air cooler. They are linked together
to simulate the primary, secondary and the decay heat removal systems.
The mass flows used in thermodynamic component models are determined
in fluid dynamics network models. The plena models can be replaced in the
programme system DYANA2 by the more sophisticated 2-dimensional code
ATTICA.
V.2. EFR Reactor Dafa and Conditions (or Ca/culafions
The EFR design CD 9/90 with a core height of 1 m has been adapted to the
DYANA2 code and the data set together with the code system were made
available for use on the computer system at KfK [11]. The EFR core is re-
presented by 6 channels which include 3 fuel regions at different burn-up
stages (500, 1000 and 1420 d burn-up), 1 breeder and 1 reflector region as
weil as fuel subassemblies stored in the vessel. An additional channel is
used to represent the peak-rated fuel pin (X = 410 W/cm) at its end of life.
Its coolant temperature rise of 196 K corresponds to the conditions in the
hottest subassembly. The major characteristics of the channels are sum-
marized in Tab.1. Each channel is vertically divided into 7 meshes and the
fuel region has 4 radial concentric annuli. Nominal power of the EFR core
is 3600 MWth . Its distribution to different channels is also given in Tab.1.
Nominal coolant inlet/outlet temperatures are 395/545 °c. The reactivity
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coefficients for the feedbacks which are considered in the DYANA2 code
are compiled in Tab.2. The design and performance of the EFR fuel pin has
been determined by using the code IAMBUS [12]. The results yielded values
for the fuel structure depending on burn-up such as stoichiometry, porosi-
ties and boundaries of equiaxed and columnar grains zones as weil as the
dimensions of the central channel.
Channel no. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Reflec-
Fuel Fuel Fuel Inter- tors,
Fuel,
Group of 500 1000 1420 Breed- nal Shield-




BU BU BU age Leak-
age
Number of
126 126 124 78 78 188 -
S/As
Number of
331 331 331 169 331 19 331
Pins per S/A
S/A Flow
45.8 45.8 45.4 15.7 3.26 1.49 48.9
(kg/s)
Total Flow
5774 5774 5635 1223 254 280 -
(kg/s)
S/A Power
9.95 9.00 8.77 1.42 0.02 0.06 12.16
(MW)
Temperature
171.4 155.0 152.3 71.6 5.3 31.8 196.0
Rise (K)
Max. Linear
Rating 336 304 298 94 0.7 35 410
(W/cm)
lable 1. Core representation in DYANA2: Group of channels with power
and flow distribution
A simplified parametric gap conductance model is included in the code
DYANA2, the parameters of which are obtained from IAMBUS calculations
at different power levels. It is a good aproximation for power levels < 100
% including transients with power reductions (ULOF and ULOHS). In the
case of overpower transients, the actual evolution of gap conductance is
not weIl. described by the parametric model, therefore this model is re-
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placed by pessimistic assumptions Iimiting the value of gap conductance
to 0.1 W/(cm K). This gives for the power-to-melt value only 570 W/cm. The
peak fuel temperature at nominal power is 2200 °C and is attained in the
hot channel with a peak linear heat rating of X=410 W/cm at the central
fuel node. Fuel melting is thus reached at about 140 % of nominal power
which causes a strong limitation for ramp rates in the case of UTOPs (see
Sect.VI.2).
The ATHENa time constant 11 (see Sect.lV) depends on the f10w rate
through the ACS, it is therefore important to model this effect correctly,
especially in flow transients Iike ULOFs. The hot plenum model for the flow
description has been improved for this case by using results of 2-dimen-
sional calculations with the DYANA/ATTICA code [11].
Reactivity Feedback Coefficients
Doppler fuel inc/. axial breeder -726 pcm
Doppler radial breeder -85 pcm
Sodium density 0.413 pcm/K
Clad expansion 0.200 pcm/K
Wrapper expansion 0.141 pcm/K
Fuel axial expansion -0.400 pcm/K
Bowing 0.0 pcm/K (conservative)
Diagrid expansion, fast (5s) -0.330 pcm/K
Diagrid expansion, slow (200s) -0.600 pcm/K
Table 2. Reactivity Feedback Coefficients: The reactivity is in units of
1 pcm = 10-5•
VI. Results of Calculations and Discussion
VI.1. Unprotected Loss of Flow Accident (ULOF)
A ULOF event starts with the loss of power to the coolant pumps of the
main and intermediate circuits. The pump coast down is determined by the
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rotational inertia of the motors and f1ywheels connected to the pumps.
Fig.2a shows the relative coolant f10w rate through the EFR core which
decreases rapidly with a halving time of 10 5 until it reaches about 4 % of
its nominal operating value after about 120 s. The power reduction, also
shown in Fig.2a, is much slower and the subsequent mismatch in power
and f10w causes the coolant temperature to rise (Fig.2b).
Two reactivity effects are directly associated with the increase in coolant
temperature (Fig.3a): (i) the positive reactivity feedback of the coolant
density reduction and (ii) the smaller and somewhat delayed negative effect
of the CRDL expansion. In addition, there are two effects indirectly associ-
ated with the coolant temperature rise: The Doppler effect and the axial
thermal fuel elongation. Their signs depend on the fuel temperature change
relative to the initial values.
The reactivity feedback effects are depicted in Fig.3a together with the net
reactivity. The initial phase of the transient, which lasts about 20 5, is de-
termined by a slight decrease of the power to about 85% of the nominal
value (Fig.2a). This is due to the negative value of the net reactivity as il-
lustrated in Fig.3a. During this phase, the biggest feedback is the coolant
density effect. Doppler and axial expansion feedbacks are both negative
and increasing in value with time, even during a phase of decreasing
power. This, somewhat surprising phenomenon is the result of the super-
position of two opposite effects affecting the fuel temperature: (i) a f1atten-
ing of the radial temperature profile due to the power density decrease in
the fuel pin and (ii) a temperature rise caused by an increase of the coolant
temperature in the channel. The net effect, as shown in Fig.3b, is a rise of
fuel temperature, the value of which increases going from the center to the
surface of the fuel.
During this time, the CRDL effect is not yet affected by the ATHENa device
and is still small. The inlet temperature effect is negligible because of the
long time for the returning sodium. Doppler, axial expansion and CRDL
expansion effects are sufficiently"large to overcompensate the positive
coolant effect and to reduce the power, but the reduction is not fast enough
to stop the coolant temperature to rise (Fig.2b).
However, the sodium temperature in the ATHENa container rises with some
delay caused by the time constants 71 and 72, as seen in FigA, and reaches
the delatching temperature of 590 oe at 20 s. The ball release mechanism
then separates CRDLs from the absorber rods which drop by gravity into
the core and shut down the reactor. In the first calculation it is assumed
that only 3 $, Le. 10 % of the shutdown reactivity, can be inserted into the
reactor by rod drop. The coolant outlet temperature decreases rapidly be-
fore reaching the sodium boiling temperature of 938 oe in the hot channel.
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- In a second calculation, it is assumed that all absorbers fail to drop. In this
case the enhanced expansion of the ATHENa devices is forcing the absor-
bers further into the core. The sodium temperature, however, continues to
rise and reaches the boiling temperature in the hot channel at 24 s. The
enhanced power reduction, caused by the enhanced CRDL expansion ef-
fect, finally leads to a decrease of the sodium temperature (Fig.2b). In all
other channels the peak sodium temperature remains below 800 oe with a
large margin to boiling.
A look at reactivity (Fig.3a) shows that in the case where the rods fai! to
drop, the enhanced expansion of the ATHENa devices forces the absorber
rods further into the core, finally providing about -1.5 $ of reactivity. The
rapid power decrease which follows leads to a further f1attening of the ra-
dial fuel temperature profile. According to Fig.3b, the fuel temperature
drops in the inner pin region below the initial values, but near the fuel
surface it remains higher than before the ULOF. This explains that the
Doppler reactivity changes its sign, whereas the axial expansion effect,
mainly determined by the surface temperature, remains negative for a
much longer time. With decreasing power, the Doppler effect is becoming
the dominant positive feedback, but the CRDL reactivity is strong enough
to overcompensate the positive effects and to finally shut down the reactor.
In order to avoid sodium boiling also in the hot channel, two measures can
be envisaged: (i) lowering the delatching temperature or (ii) extension of
f10w coast down by increase of the rotational inertia of sodium pump motor
and f1ywheel in the primary circuit. Both methods have been investigated
with DYANA2 calculations. Fig.5 shows sodium outlet temperature of the
hot channel for 3 different values of the delatching temperature. By de-
creasing its value to 580 or 570 oe, respectively, the peak temperature re-
mains below the boiling point. This can also be achieved by increasing the
pump coast down halving time from 10 to 12 or 14 s, respectively, as seen
in Fig.6. In the latter case, the reduction of the first temperature peak leads
to a smaller absorber insertion and thus to a slower power reduction and
a higher subsequent second temperature peak.
It has to be emphasized that for all ULOF calculations the most pessimistic
conditions have been assumed concerning the control rod positions which
are near the upper edge of the core, Le. only 5 cm inserted. This corre-
sponds to a core at the end of a cycle. In cores at lower burn-up stages,
the rods are farther inserted and their efficiency is higher. The same CRDL
expansion yields in this case a faster and more negative feedback reactiv-
ity.
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VI.2. Unprotected Transient Overpower Accident (UTOP)
General Case
A UTOP accident is initiated by an uncontrolled withdrawal of a control rod,
the reactor being at nominal conditions. The f10w rate remains constant.
Results of calculations are shown in Figs.7 to 9 for the case with a ramp
rate of 1 ~/s and an initial control rod position of 10 cm, which corresponds
to almost end of core cycle conditions. The power rises as the control rod
is withdrawn (Fig.7a) and the fuel temperature increases, especially in the
inner parts of the tuel pellets as can be seen in Fig.7b. Therefore the
Doppler effect is the dominant source of negative feedback and much
stronger than the axial fuel thermal expansion effect which is based on fuel
surface temperature (cf. Fig.8a). On the other hand, the coolant temper-
ature rise is moderate, as indicated in Fig.9, and thus the CRDL effect is
small. The overall effect is a positive net reactivity. After an initial transition
phase of several seconds, the ramp rate, introduced by control rod with-
drawal, and the coolant reactivity as positive contributions, are practically
compensated by the negative contributors to the feedback. As a conse-
quence, there is only a slight additional increase of the net reactivity.
The resulting power rise would tinally lead to incipient fuel melting in the
central part of the fuel in the hot channel. Whether this can be avoided,
depends on the delatching of the ATHENa devices. The further course of
the transient is therefore entirely determined by the assumptions made
about the efficacy of the ATHENa devices. After the ATHENa devices have
reached their delatching temperature, two different, pessimistic assumption
are made: (i) a single rod drops, providing a minimum of -0.6 $ of reactivity
or (ii) all rods are jammed.
Single Rod Drop
In the first case, Le. drop of a single rod, there is a steplike reactivity
change which brings the reactor to subcriticality (Fig.8a). However, the net
reactivity starts rising again rapidly, essentially due to the Doppler effect
which becomes now positive as a consequence of the drop of tuel tem-
perature (Fig.7b). The power is reduced in a prompt jump to 80 % of its
nominal value and it decreases in the further course of the transient until
it reaches its asymptotic value at about 50 % of its nominal value (Fig.7a).
Fuel and coolant temperature are reduced to values corresponding to the
lower power level and nominal f10w rate. The net reactivity approaches
zero (Fig.8a) and the power is stabilized, since the reactivity of -0.6 $ is not
sufficient to shut down the reactor. A complete shut down would need at
least -1 $ of reactivity or the drop of 2 control rods.
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All Rods Jammed
In the case where all rods are jammed, the results of calculations are also
shown in Figs.7, 8b and 9. The power rise is terminated by delatching of
the absorbers, but the fuel in the hot channel starts to melt (Fig.7b) and
may finally lead to pin failure with a possibility of severe consequences for
the plant safety. The reactor remains delayed supercritical but the reactivity
approaches the value of zero (Fig.8b), stabilizing the power at about 140%
of its nominal value (Fig.7a). Due to the high fuel temperature, Doppler
effect and axial expansion are sufficiently high to compensate together with
the small CRDL effect the inserted reactivity and the coolant effect. It is
evident that in this case the efficacy of the ATHENa device is not sufficient
to stabilize the reactor at a low enough power level to avoid fuel melting
in the hot channel.
Reduction of Ramp Rate and/or Delatching Temperature
This is, however, the case if either the delatching temperature or the ramp
rate are reduced. The effect of ramp rate or delatching temperature re-
duction on hot channel peak fuel temperature for transients from nominal
conditions and initial control rod positions of 10 cm is shown in Fig.10a.
The power rise is terminated before fuel melting is reached, however, the
asymptotic power level is still rather high (Fig.10b), because only a smal.l.
amount of reactivity could be inserted by.the ATHENa devices.
Influence of Initial Rod Position
The influence of the initial rod positions has also been investigated by
DYANA2 calculations. The efficiency of the absorbers increases if the rods
are more inserted into the core, therefore the ATHENa devices are more
effective for the same amount of CRDL expansion. This can be c1early seen
in Fig.11, which shows the CRDL effect and the net reactivity for 3 different
values of initial control rod insertion. A consequence of the increased ab-
sorber reactivity is, that the reactor is intermediately subcritical and the
power is reduced to a level (Fig.12a) which is sufficiently low to avoid fuel
melting (Fig.12b). The asymptotic power, however, is always above the
nominal power level, since the CRDL reactivity does not completely com-
pensate the reactivity inserted by control rod withdrawal.
Stroke Limitation
A control rod stroke limitation is considered as a countermeasure against
excessive reactivity insertion in the frame of the Third Shutdown Level (see
Sect.ll). In order to investigate the efficiency of this measure, calculations
have been made by insertion of reactivity ramps which are terminated after
a given reactivity value is atiained. The ATHENa device is not active in
these calculations. The results in Fig.13 show that the stroke has to be
limited to about 0.35 $ to avoid fuel melting. The peak fuel temperature
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depends only slightly on the ramp rate. Again, the reactor is stabilized at
a rather elevated power level.
A problem with this measure is, that the reactivity range between nominal
critical and stroke limit decreases rather rapidly at operation with core
burn-up and the stroke limit has to be re-adjusted periodically. This is not
only inconvenient for reactor operation, but it bears the possibility of in-
advertent misadjustment, Le. setting of excessive limits, with severe con-
sequences for the safety in the extremely improbable case of the occur-
rence of a UTOP accident. It is preferable to rely on the passive action of
the ATHENa devices which limit the stroke by delatching the absorbers
from the CRDLs.
UTOPs from Part Load Conditions
So far only transients starting from nominal conditions or full-Ioad have
been considered. According to Fig.1, the margin to fuel melting is smallest
for these transients. It is, however, of interest to study also cases which Iie
inside the region of power operation. Since at least the power is below the
nominal value, the term part-load is used for these conditions. In order to
stay below the nominal value of coolant outlet temperature, the operational
points are confined by the condition p < q. In the case of p = q, the coolant
temperature rise between core inlet and outlet is the same as in nominal
conditions. If the reactor is operated at part-load but 100% coolant flow
rate, the temperature rise along the core channels is smaller than at no-
minal conditions. This is disadvantageous for the efficacy of the ATHENa
devices, because the margin to delatching temperature is increased.
Therefore two cases have been investigated where the transient starts from
20% of full power but with nominal coolant f10w rate. The ramp rates which
are applied are 0.5 and 1.0 ~/s, respectively, with delatching temperatures
of 580 and 570°C, respectively. Results are shown in Figs.14a to 14b and
compared with transients from nominal conditions. The power rise is ter-
minated by the action of the ATHENa devices at about the same power
level (130 to 135% full power) as the reference cases (Fig.14a), the peak
fuel temperature is only slightly higher (10 to 20°C) than in the reference
cases (Fig.14b).
The other two transients which again start from 20% full power, but with
only 50% of nominal f10w rate, are also studied by insertion of ramp rates
of 0.5 and 1.0 ~/s, respectively. The results, as illustrated in Figs.15 and 16,
show that in both cases the power rise is terminated at levels weil below
full power with the consequence of big margins to fuel melting and sodium
boiling in the hot channel. This is due to the reduced f10w rate which re-
sults in faster rises of coolant outlet temperature with power. As a con-
sequence, the delatching temperature is attained at a lower power level
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and lower fuel temperatures. The results confirm, what is already sug-
gested by Fig.1, that transients which start from conditions with full f10w
rate have the smallest margin to fuel melting.
VII. Conclusions
In the safety analysis of fast reactors, ATWS events have to be considered
and the safety margins and eventual consequences have to be assessed,
even when their frequency of occurrence lies far beyond the design basis
accident. In the case of the EFR, the safety approach foresees, in addition
to preventive measures already provided within the design basis, further
measures of risk minimization in the frame of the so-ca lied Third Shutdown
Level. One of these measures is a control rod enhanced expansion device,
called ATHENa, which has been especially developed by KfK together with
SIEMENS as a passive device to practically exclude core damage, even in
events with shutdown system failures.
The efficiency of the ATHENa device to prevent sodium boiling and fuel
melting in ATWS events in EFR has been investigated by calculations with
the dynamics code DYANA2.
In the case of ULOF accidents, sodium boiling can be prevented even in the
hot channel, if at least one out the 24 rods equipped with ATHENa devices
drops into the core after delatching of the absorbers. The probability that
all rods remain jammed after delatching is so extremely low that this event
can be placed far into the hypothetical category. But even then, sodium
boiling could be prevented by extending the pump coast down halving time
from 10 to 12 s or by a reduction of the delatching temperature to 580 oe
or less.
In UTOP accidents caused by an uncontrolled withdrawal of a control rod,
the main concern is incipient fuel melting. The results of the calculations
have shown that if the ramp rate is limited to values not exceeding 1 ~/s,
the power rise can be terminated by delatching the absorbers before fuel
melting occurs. Again, assuming the extremely hypothetical case that all
rods remain jammed after delatching, fuel melting in the hot channel could
only be prevented by reduction of the delatching temperature. The ATHENa
devices can reliably terminate the insertion of reactivity by delatching the
absorbers from the drive lines and are thus preferable to control rod stroke
limitations.
The relatively high linear heat rating of the EFR hot channel is the cause
of the rather early incipient fuel melting. A core optimization in the sense
of reducing the hot channel heat rating is a very efficient measure to reduce
17
the risk of fuel melting. Therefore, all efforts should be put in the design
of a weil flattened power distribution. In this case, there is more freedom
of choice for pump coast down halving time, ramp rate and delatching
temperature.
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Fig.2. ULOF from nominal conditions and delatching temperature of 590 oe:
a) Normalized power and flow rate, case without scram.
b) Hot channel coolant outlet temperature. Absorber rods either drop (with
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Fig.3. ULOF from nominal conditions and delatching temperature of 590 oe:
a) Net reactivity and feedbacks.
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Fig.4. ULOF from nominal conditions and delatching temperature of 590 oe:







































Fig.5. ULOF from nominal conditions with different delatching temperatures:
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Fig.6. ULOF from nominal conditions for different values of pump coast down
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Fig.7. UTOP trom nominal conditions with a ramp rate ot 1~/s with and without
scram (-0.6 $). Delatching temperature is 580 oe and control rod position
10 cm:
a) Normalized power.









'\ --i-::-;"=:' 11 .-. -+. -. _L ! : ; 1 1 1" .. External React.
'\! 1 ! ; 1'-'l'-'-1-'-'r'-'1'-'-'! ~-----------------4
\ I i ! i ! i ! i ! -" CRDL Expansion
m"l\~r ····I····1······· m·l·······"1···lm·lm./.m·····l· Inl. Temp.
1 . 1 1 1 1 1 j i j --- Ax. Expansion
l::~;~]~;~[;~:[·~-I:~;:I~;:;~[:l~r =- :::~~:: ..
j 1 1 i j 1 j 1 i 1 - Net ReactlVlty













80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240
Time (s)
Fig.8. UTOP from nominal conditions with a ramp rate of 1~/s with and without
scram (-0.6 $). Delatching temperature is 580 oe and control rod position
10 cm:
a) Net reactivity and feedbacks for case with scram.
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Fig.9. UTOP from nominal conditions with a ramp rate of 1~/s with and without
scram (-0.6 $). Delatching temperature is 580 oe and control rod position
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Fig.10. UTOPs tram nominal conditions with different ramp rates and delatching
temperatures. Contral rod position 10 cm:
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Fig.11. UTOPs fram nominal conditions with a ramp rate of 1 ~/s and different
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Fig.12. UTOPs trom nominal conditions with different ramp rates and control rod
positions:
a) Normalized power.
b) Hot channel tuel central temperatures.
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Fig.13. Hot channel tuel temperatures tor stroke limited UTOPs trom nominal
conditions. Initial control rod position 10 cm.
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Fig.14. UTOPs trom different power levels with nominal coolant tlow rate. Control
rod position 10 cm:
a) Normalized power.
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Fig·.15. UTOPs fram 20% of full power with 50% of nominal flow rate. Control rod
position 10 cm:
a) Normalized power.
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Fig.16. UTOPs from 20% of fulJ power with 50% of nominal f10w rate. Control rod
position 10 cm: Hot channel coolant outlet temperatures.
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